Pakistan's Five-Fold Strategy to Conceal Afghanistan Policy Failures and Pressure Taliban Leadership

Pakistan is actively reshaping global narratives amid escalating tensions with Afghanistan and stalled peace talks with the Taliban government. Islamabad's strategic approach includes portraying itself as a victim of cross-border terrorism, characterizing the Taliban as uncooperative, seeking international support from Western and Islamic allies, justifying military interventions in Afghanistan, and attributing the Taliban rift to Indian influence. These strategies serve to conceal Pakistan's failed "strategic depth" policy in Afghanistan while pressuring Taliban leadership to comply with Pakistani interests. Emboldened by strengthened U.S. relations and growing Middle Eastern diplomatic influence, Pakistan believes it can successfully reframe Afghanistan perceptions. While potentially effective short-term, this approach risks permanently damaging Taliban relations.

Pakistan has positioned itself internationally as a victim of terrorism originating from Afghan territory. Islamabad consistently accuses the Taliban-led government of harboring Tehrik‑i‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and militant groups attacking Pakistani forces. During recent Istanbul negotiations (mediated by Turkey and Qatar), Pakistan initially declared the talks had "ended without any workable solution" and criticized Afghanistan's "indifference to Pakistan's losses." Subsequent mediation extended discussions until October 30, with follow-up talks scheduled for November 6 in Istanbul. By emphasizing its suffering and sacrifices, Pakistan portrays itself as a responsible, peace-seeking neighbor rebuffed by Taliban intransigence, providing moral leverage in international forums.

By criticizing the Taliban while highlighting its own peaceful intentions, Pakistan positions itself as a defender of peace. Pakistani officials claim the country has "always desired, advocated and immensely sacrificed for peace and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan" while warning that "Pakistan's patience has run its course." Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir issued stark warnings to the Taliban to choose between "peace and chaos," declaring in January 2024 that "when it comes to the safety and security of every single Pakistani, the whole of Afghanistan can be damned." This dual positioning as both willing negotiator and formidable military power resonates with the international community's preference for diplomatic solutions over military interventions. Pakistan's engagement in Doha and Istanbul negotiations, followed by claims of Taliban backtracking, shifts blame to Kabul for bilateral tensions.

Failed negotiations enable Pakistan to mobilize external support from Western and Islamic nations to pressure the Taliban. Islamabad has consistently argued to Washington that Afghan stability requires addressing Pakistan's security concerns, particularly regarding the TTP. With Taliban leaders dismissing militancy in Pakistan as an "internal problem," Islamabad leverages negotiation setbacks to demonstrate Taliban unreliability, thereby securing financial aid, intelligence support, military cooperation, and diplomatic backing from Western governments. Pakistan maintains close counterterrorism partnership with the United States, having strengthened bilateral security cooperation under the Trump administration. With renewed Washington support and ongoing U.S.-Afghanistan tensions over Bagram airbase control, Islamabad sees opportunities to strengthen external alliances while characterizing the Taliban as a regional and global security threat.

The diplomatic stalemate provides Pakistan convenient justification for aggressive military actions against Afghanistan under the guise of counterterrorism operations targeting TTP and affiliates. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif threatened that Pakistan wouldn't need "even a fraction of its full arsenal to completely obliterate the Taliban regime" if further provoked. Diplomatic breakdown may trigger increased Pakistani military incursions deeper into Afghanistan, potentially reaching Kabul or Kandahar. Growing domestic Pakistani calls for "open war" or redrawing the Durand Line through territorial capture in eastern Afghanistan have emerged. Additional options include intensified airstrikes on alleged militant hideouts, targeted elimination of TTP leadership, and potential regime change efforts in Kabul. Pakistan is establishing a narrative justifying escalatory actions should ceasefire agreements collapse or peace talks fail.

Pakistan also exploits the Taliban deadlock to advance propaganda claiming Indian interference through Afghanistan via militant group support. Recent Pakistani narratives increasingly blame India for influencing the Taliban regime to destabilize Pakistan's western regions. Despite providing no evidence of Indian involvement, this narrative serves Pakistan's military establishment by diverting attention from counterterrorism failures, pressuring the Taliban, and casting India as a regional destabilizer. Pakistan was visibly unsettled by Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi's multi-day visit to India, where he praised India as a "close friend" providing humanitarian assistance and expressed Afghanistan's desire for "mutual respect, trade, and people-to-people relations" with India.

New Delhi's recent upgrade of its "technical" mission in Kabul to a full embassy represents, for Pakistan, a clear failure of its decades-old "strategic depth" policy. Expressing disapproval and frustration, Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Kabul, allegedly targeting TTP leaders, during Muttaqi's India visit. This demonstrates Pakistan's rejection of strengthening Kabul-New Delhi diplomatic ties and signals potential intensification of pressure on the Taliban through military strikes and anti-India narrative campaigns. Nevertheless, these tactics cannot resolve Pakistan's fundamental issues with the Taliban administration, improve internal security, or address the country's deep ethnic divisions.

By combining these strategies, Pakistan may secure short-term advantages from ongoing Taliban tensions. Third-party mediation from Qatar and Turkey provides additional leverage to pressure the Taliban and shape global narratives and negotiation outcomes favorably. Pakistan aims to modify Taliban behavior to align with Pakistani interests, restrict Kabul-New Delhi relations, and leverage regional instability as a proven tool for attracting international attention.

This approach carries significant risks for Pakistan. Overreliance on military operations and coercive diplomacy may further alienate the Afghan Taliban, diminish Pakistani influence, and increase prospects for broader armed conflict. The Taliban may distance themselves from Pakistan while developing new regional and international partnerships. Unlike the 1990s Taliban regime, Taliban 2.0 resists Pakistani policy directives and demands respectful treatment. Conversely, Pakistan refuses to accept Taliban independence, particularly regarding Afghanistan-India relations, and continues pushing for compliant leadership in Kabul. Even after four years, Islamabad has not officially recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government, generating serious mistrust in Kabul regarding Pakistani intentions and contributing significantly to bilateral tensions.

Pakistan's Afghanistan policy has transformed from triumphant to disappointed since August 2021. As the Taliban reject subordination to Islamabad, Pakistan has pivoted to coercive diplomacy, military action, and cross-border terrorism narratives to justify future hard-line approaches toward Afghanistan. While potentially beneficial short-term given the Taliban's international credibility challenges, Pakistan risks losing long-term Taliban influence, intensifying Afghan public anger (especially among refugees and those affected by Pakistani military actions), increasing local militancy, and potentially uniting disaffected Pashtun communities across the border.

The question remains whether Pakistan's aggressive Afghanistan policy will successfully pressure the Taliban and establish lasting bilateral peace, or whether regional instability will again attract international attention and material support for Islamabad. One certainty exists: under Field Marshal Munir's leadership, Pakistan's military establishment will likely leverage tensions on both eastern and western borders to consolidate power and deflect public accountability for recurring counterterrorism failures and destabilizing regional policies.

(Sarral Sharma is a Doctoral Candidate at JNU and a former Consultant at the National Security Council Secretariat)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author