Inside China's Military Disinformation Campaign: How Beijing Uses AI and Propaganda to Boost Global Arms Sales

In November 2025, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) documented Beijing's orchestrated disinformation campaign targeting France's Rafale fighter jets following India's deployment of these aircraft in operations against Pakistan. Chinese operatives employed sophisticated AI-generated imagery and video game footage, presenting them as authentic wreckage evidence to falsely claim that Pakistan's Chinese-manufactured J-10 fighters had successfully downed Indian Rafales. This deliberate strategy aimed to position China's J-10 and J-35 fighter aircraft as superior alternatives to French, Russian, or Indian combat platforms.

The disinformation effort achieved partial success. Indonesia, previously considering multiple options, proceeded to acquire 42 J-10 fighters in October 2025, with a contract value of approximately USD9 billion. This incident raises significant questions about China's aggressive weapons marketing strategies, whether this represents an isolated incident or forms part of a systematic pattern, and China's overall performance in the global arms export marketplace.

Beijing's strategic approach follows a recognizable pattern: initially, fabricated or misleading visual content is disseminated online to establish a narrative designed to shape early public perception. Subsequently, Chinese state media outlets and sympathetic publications amplify these narratives, lending them apparent official credibility. In the final phase, Chinese diplomatic representatives, embassy officials, and defense attachés quietly advocate with potential buyers, referencing the fabricated accounts as evidence of Chinese weapons' purported effectiveness in recent conflicts.

The anticipated benefits for China are substantial. The global market for major weapons systems has limited buyers, making even incremental gains potentially lucrative in terms of revenue and strategic influence. Advanced weapons sales create long-term customer dependencies through spare parts procurement, training programs, and maintenance contracts, establishing durable influence for Beijing while diminishing Western presence in these regions. Additionally, by undermining confidence in Western defense systems, China simultaneously instills doubt among potential buyers while reassuring its core clients including Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.

Despite these efforts, China remains widely categorized as a third-tier arms exporter, generally viewed as a discount supplier overshadowed by Western and Russian defense manufacturers. China's military-industrial foundation initially developed through imitation and reverse-engineering of Soviet systems. Following the departure of Soviet advisers after the 1960 Sino-Soviet split, China spent decades limited to exporting small arms, light equipment, and other basic weapon systems to friendly states, primarily as grant-based assistance.

The landscape transformed during the 1980s when Middle Eastern conflicts created significant markets for Beijing's heavy weaponry. However, the Cold War's conclusion and subsequent intensified global competition dramatically reduced China's market share. The first Gulf War inflicted further damage, as the poor combat performance of Soviet-designed systems undermined Moscow's reputation and more severely impacted China's derivative products. Furthermore, Beijing's reputation as a supplier of low-technology weapons, recurring performance issues, and chronic spare parts shortages consistently undermined its market appeal.

Nevertheless, since 2000, Beijing has established a specific market niche by targeting a select group of clients. As of 2023, China commands approximately 5% of global arms exports, compared with America's 40% and Russia's 16%. Moreover, approximately 60% of China's sales—particularly aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, and naval vessels with co-production arrangements—are directed to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Beyond these primary customers, nations including Algeria, Egypt, the UAE, and others have acquired Chinese drones and directed-energy systems, often with mixed or disappointing operational results. For many of these countries, China represents a fallback option where competitive pricing and opaque contractual terms can potentially facilitate corruption among military leadership.

However, China's ambitions to ascend the arms-export hierarchy continue to encounter fundamental obstacles. Persistent technical deficiencies, performance limitations, and maintenance failures—from Myanmar's JF-17 fighters to Pakistan's air-defense systems and naval platforms—undermine customer confidence and highlight the hidden costs associated with seemingly inexpensive equipment. This creates a widening disparity between sophisticated marketing presentations and underwhelming field performance, compelling clients to diversify their suppliers or demand more stringent warranty and maintenance provisions. Beijing also struggles to compete effectively in advanced technologies including sensor fusion and logistics systems, areas where Western manufacturers maintain decisive advantages.

Consequently, Beijing has increasingly relied on familiar tactics: aggressive pricing strategies, technology-transfer incentives, diplomatic pressure, and information campaigns designed to shape market perception. While these approaches deliver incremental gains and deepen influence over dependent clients, they prove less effective in markets prioritizing performance metrics and transparency. Furthermore, as emerging suppliers including India, Turkey, and South Korea enter the global arms trade with superior technology and reputation, maintaining even a third-tier position will become increasingly challenging for China in coming years.

[Harsh V. Pant is Vice President, Observer Research Foundation, and Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF.]

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author