Bagram Air Base: The Strategic Pivot in US-Taliban Relations and Afghanistan-Pakistan Tensions

The recent fierce border clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have ignited speculation that US President Donald Trump's desire to regain control of Bagram military base lies at the conflict's core. This theory is supported by the timing of Pakistan's initiative to bomb Afghanistan, which coincided with the Taliban foreign minister's visit to India. Days before this, Trump had warned of "bad things" if the Taliban refused to return Bagram, fueling speculation given Trump's close relationship with Pakistan and its Army Chief Field Marshall Asim Munir - a connection previously attributed to cryptocurrency deals, mineral rights promises, and China containment strategies.

Several strategic reasons exist for the US to reclaim Bagram, which American forces abandoned suddenly in 2021 before withdrawing from Afghanistan. The base would provide the US with a strategic Eurasian foothold for monitoring China, Iran, Russia, Central Asian states, Pakistan, and its nuclear capabilities.

Pakistan would also benefit substantially from such an arrangement. As a rentier state constantly seeking service opportunities, Pakistan stands to gain financially. Bagram, one of the world's largest air bases located in Parwan province about 60 km from Kabul, was originally built by the Soviets in the 1950s before US occupation following 9/11. The Americans significantly expanded it, constructing powerful concrete and steel runways and permanent barracks, making it the largest US military hub during their 20-year Afghan presence. American reoccupation would require Pakistani logistical support and supply chain management, generating substantial revenue for Pakistan.

An American presence would also help control the Taliban, which Pakistan views as having gone rogue. India's deepening relationship with the Taliban and upgraded diplomatic presence in Kabul heightens Pakistan's fear of a two-front conflict. This explains Pakistan's extensive efforts to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan (notably, the recent Saudi-Pakistan defense agreement seemed unaffected by the border skirmishes). Iran's recent Taliban overtures further complicate matters. While Pakistan accelerates deportations of Afghan refugees, Iran has offered to accept thousands of Afghan migrant workers. A fragile ceasefire currently holds, largely thanks to Qatari and Saudi Arabian intervention.

Pakistan isn't alone in potentially welcoming US return to Afghanistan. Members and supporters of the previous US-backed Afghan government, many now living abroad, and the predominantly Tajik National Resistance Front also favor this prospect.

In The National Interest, Abdullah Khenjani, Political Bureau head of the National Resistance Front, recently suggested that "If Trump truly wants to return an American presence to the Bagram Air Base, he might consider strengthening these resistance groups." Khenjani described the NRF as "an anti-Taliban resistance movement devoted to democratic principles, composed mainly of former Afghan soldiers who fought alongside US and coalition forces against the Taliban and have continued the struggle even after America's withdrawal and the republican government's fall."

A month later, the same publication featured Afghan journalist and activist Natiq Malikzada arguing, "If America's long-term safety at a base depends on security assistance from surrounding communities, the Taliban are the wrong guarantor. Anti-Taliban networks are the ones with social capital there. As an added bonus, many of these networks are pro-democratic in their outlook, and fought alongside the United States against the Taliban during the 20-year conflict. Any durable arrangement near Bagram ought to start with them."

The National Front continues representing Afghanistan officially in Tajikistan, through which India, Iran and Russia once channeled military and other support to anti-Taliban forces in the late 1990s, before 9/11 and the "war on terror." This Tajikistan route undoubtedly factors into arguments for Trump administration seizure of Bagram in coordination with Taliban opponents. However, these arguments seem detached from reality.

If taken seriously, such advice would merely repeat history, triggering another cycle of warfare and bloodshed. This mirrors the events of 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom targeted the first Taliban administration. Though officially ending in 2014, it evolved into America's "longest war," only to conclude with the Taliban's return.

A US return to Bagram now would face far greater obstacles than before.

The Taliban have firmly rejected Trump's proposals, emphasizing Afghan "sovereignty" as non-negotiable.

Additionally, unlike in 2001 when the US launched its war on terror with substantial global goodwill, today's landscape differs dramatically. Then, even current adversaries like Russia, China, Iran, and Central Asian countries supported the US, with some even hosting American bases. Pakistan actively participated, and India provided non-military support. Now, China, Iran, and Russia - the very nations the US aims to monitor from Bagram - oppose such presence. While Central Asian countries might not object to US regional involvement, they've established tactical relationships with the Taliban and seek regional stability. They remain strategically aligned with Russia, limiting their ability to support policies counter to Russian interests.

After supporting the US-backed Afghan government for over two decades, India has pragmatically accepted Taliban rule as reality, preferring engagement to opposition. Growing US-Pakistan cooperation following Operation Sindoor and developments in Bangladesh have heightened Indian concerns.

Opposition to US presence in Bagram was explicitly reflected in a recent joint statement from the Moscow Format consultations, which deemed "unacceptable" any "attempts by countries to deploy their military infrastructure in Afghanistan and neighboring states, since this does not serve the interests of regional peace and stability" - a thinly veiled reference to the US. Signatories included India, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan.

Complicating matters further, some Taliban factions oppose Trump's proposition. The issue first emerged in April when reports surfaced of an American C-17 aircraft landing at Bagram, bringing military vehicles, equipment, and senior intelligence officials, including CIA representatives. The trip followed President Trump's first cabinet meeting, where he declared his administration would "keep Bagram ... not because of Afghanistan but because of China."

Some Taliban leadership elements might consider accommodating US presence if it brought sanctions relief, international legitimacy, and access to approximately $9 billion in frozen foreign reserves held mostly in US banks. Sources suggest Trump's demand might actually be accommodated in secret annexes to the 2020 Doha Accords between the first Trump administration and Taliban, which facilitated US withdrawal and Taliban return. These sources note that Taliban public rejection of US control over Bagram is consistent with their past position, having waged war against both the Republican government and US forces specifically to remove "foreign troops" from Afghan soil.

Even if Taliban leadership permitted American presence at Bagram or elsewhere, their cadres and fighters would likely resist, potentially targeting Americans again. This could cause internal Taliban division and plunge the country back into chaos. Concerns exist that such presence and Taliban fragmentation would strengthen ISIS-KP and other terrorist groups by weakening Taliban cohesion and potentially driving disaffected cadres to join these organizations.

In this scenario, the US would depend exclusively on Pakistan - a partner whose duplicity in the war on terror America has already experienced.

Much depends on how Taliban leadership navigates this challenge and what support regional partners provide. For the Taliban, the Bagram issue may represent the ultimate test of their leadership capacity.

(The author is a journalist and political analyst)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author