India's Strategic Engagement with the Taliban: Understanding Amir Khan Muttaqi's Visit to New Delhi

Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Acting Foreign Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, is scheduled to visit New Delhi from October 9-16, having secured a waiver from the UNSC sanctions committee after an unsuccessful attempt in September. His agenda includes meeting with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, following his participation in the Moscow Format Dialogue in Russia. This visit raises significant questions about the evolution of India-Taliban relations over the past four years. While engaging with the Taliban has become a strategic necessity, questions remain about the nature of this engagement and India's ability to safeguard its interests effectively.

When the Taliban seized power in August 2021, India's response was both immediate and measured. The country quickly closed its consulates and embassy, revoked visas, and evacuated its citizens as the situation deteriorated. However, India was initially hesitant about how to approach the new regime. Several weeks after the Taliban's return, India's ambassador in Qatar met with the head of the Taliban's political office in Doha to seek assurances regarding India's security interests. Following a visit by a senior Ministry of External Affairs official to Kabul in June 2022, New Delhi established a technical mission to coordinate and monitor aid distribution. This reluctant initial engagement has gradually transformed into an acknowledgment of the necessity to deal with the Taliban's presence.

A significant development occurred earlier this year when the Indian Foreign Secretary met with Muttaqi in Dubai, marking the first high-level interaction between the two sides. The discussions covered a wide range of topics, including humanitarian assistance, development aid, and the strategic importance of the Chabahar port for trade and aid delivery. In their official statement, the Taliban's Ministry of Foreign Affairs described India as a key 'economic and regional player'. Following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in April, an Indian delegation met with Muttaqi, which was later followed by a phone conversation between Jaishankar and Muttaqi, where India expressed appreciation for the Taliban's condemnation of the Pahalgam attacks.

The January meeting between Indian officials and Muttaqi occurred against the backdrop of Pakistan's air strikes in Afghanistan and India's subsequent condemnation. The April interactions followed the Pahalgam terror attack and India's retaliatory strikes on Pakistan under Operation Sindoor. The Taliban condemned the attack, noting its negative impact on regional stability. The deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has created additional space for India to engage with the Taliban regime.

India's approach to Afghanistan has traditionally been framed in terms of historical and cultural connections, but New Delhi has always been aware of the security challenges emanating from its northwestern frontier. When the Taliban returned to power, concerns arose about their support for terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and the presence of groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), as well as anti-India groups like Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohamed.

The increasing regional engagement with the Taliban has also motivated India's diplomatic outreach. In July this year, Russia became the first nation to formally recognize the Islamic Emirate since the Taliban's return. While other countries like China, Iran, and Central Asian nations haven't granted formal recognition, they have intensified their engagement through ambassador exchanges or by transferring control of their embassies to Taliban appointees.

For the Taliban, engagement with India helps create an impression of legitimacy for their domestic audience. Since returning to power, they have attempted to present their foreign policy as pragmatic, focused on a 'balanced and economic' approach. Their deteriorating relationship with Pakistan allows them to demonstrate independence from Islamabad and establish a distinct identity. While this creates diplomatic opportunities for India, New Delhi must remain mindful of the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral dynamics.

India's stance on Afghanistan significantly impacts the Afghan people. The closure of Indian missions in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover and the subsequent engagement with the regime has affected ordinary Afghans. In recent years, there have been persistent calls for India to resume visa services, increase humanitarian aid, and refocus on development assistance. The Taliban have also urged India to restart infrastructure projects and welcome investments. Following the earthquake on August 31, India was among the first countries to offer assistance, delivering food, water purifiers, tents, and essential medicines through the Chabahar port, reinforcing its commitment to supporting the Afghan people.

Muttaqi's upcoming visit is expected to include discussions about appointing a Taliban-supported ambassador to the Indian embassy, a long-standing request from the group. Republic-era appointees left the embassy in November 2023, while the Mumbai consulate already has an appointee reporting to Kabul. The Acting Foreign Minister may push for further institutionalization of these arrangements. He is also likely to reiterate requests for more visas, investments, and the resumption of infrastructure projects. For India, securing its security interests and obtaining guarantees from the Taliban remains the primary concern.

India's increasing engagement with the Taliban coincides with the growing recognition of the group's political reality in Afghanistan, as more countries establish communication channels. The concerns about terrorist groups and other security risks necessitate this engagement. However, India is expected to balance its political interactions with the Taliban regime with continued support for the Afghan people. As high-level engagements become more frequent, there will be expectations for India to increase its support for Afghans while advocating for the Taliban to ease their restrictions on women and minorities. The extent of India's leverage in promoting these changes and the reliability of the Taliban in supporting India's interests remain uncertain.