Analyzing the Saudi-Pakistan Defence Pact: Strategic Implications Beyond Bilateral Relations

The strategic community has recently encountered an unusual form of deterrence that falls outside traditional nuclear weapons literature. This involves the 'Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement' featured in a Joint Statement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, though the actual text remains undisclosed. While widely discussed, the precise implications of this agreement remain somewhat unclear.

The Joint Statement's language specifies aspects of defense cooperation between the two nations to "strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression" and declares that "any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both." Whether the actual agreement contains more specific details remains unknown, but this wording appears straightforward. Pakistan's Defence Minister initially stated that nuclear weapons "were not on the radar" but later clarified to GeoTV that "What we have, our (nuclear) capabilities, will absolutely be available under this pact."

The Defense Minister's authority on this matter is questionable. Historically, few civilians have accessed Pakistan's nuclear facilities aside from the many Chinese workers there. Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz was among these rare civilians, touring Pakistan's secret nuclear installations in May 1999 and receiving briefings from AQ Khan, the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program. Even former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had been denied such access. The current Defence Minister ranks considerably lower in the hierarchy of importance. The open secret remains that Saudi Arabia funded the "Islamic bomb," but the implications for actual deterrence remain ambiguous.

Deterrence involves more than simply acquiring nuclear capabilities from another nation. Saudi Arabia purchased missiles from China in 1988, which became operational around 1989 with a 2,500 km range capable of reaching Israel. Two notable aspects characterized this acquisition: first, these highly inaccurate missiles would only serve effectively in a nuclear capacity, though no evidence exists of warhead transfers despite the construction of a multi-billion dollar military complex featuring underground hardened shelters and silos. Experts note that Pakistani scientists frequently entered Saudi Arabia under the guise of religious pilgrimage, which correlates with a Saudi defector's revelation that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense agreement during the 1990s.

While this arrangement isn't new, the public declaration along similar lines indicates Riyadh now wishes to make this relationship public. Interestingly, Israel was never the target even then—Iran was. The changing geopolitical landscape is evident in Iran's welcoming of the Saudi-Pakistan agreement as "a beginning for a comprehensive regional security system" for West Asia—a statement that likely alarmed Pakistani nuclear planners, as implementing a regional security pact presents significant operational challenges.

Pakistan maintains the distinction of being the only Muslim state with nuclear capabilities, possessing approximately 170 warheads (compared to India's roughly 180) distributed across air, sea, and land launch platforms. However, these weapons originate from Chinese technology and support. They underpin Pakistan's deliberately ambiguous nuclear posture, which includes first-use options and claimed 'tactical' nuclear weapons. This requires substantial numbers, which already fall below India's arsenal. Extending this coverage to include multiple states, particularly Shia Iran, appears fundamentally untenable.

Questions arise about whether Saudi Arabia and potentially other nations would adopt Pakistan's dangerous nuclear doctrine, and against whom it would be directed. Currently, it's unlikely to target Iran and probably not Israel—though Tel Aviv would perceive it as such and respond accordingly without waiting for public confirmation. However, Riyadh is unlikely to antagonize Israel by adopting such an unstable doctrine.

The credibility of this 'umbrella' remains questionable. Strategic theorist K. Subrahmanyam articulated that deterrence effectiveness depends on believability rather than numbers. NATO addressed this by positioning US weapons and troops in Europe, ensuring that any attack killing US soldiers would inevitably trigger retaliation—but only when confronting another nuclear power. The notion that NATO would employ nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states lacks plausibility, regardless of Trump's rhetoric. Would Pakistan's nuclear guarantees, supported by Chinese technology and engineers, prove credible in a potential Shia-Sunni conflict? Notably, Pakistan quickly withdrew from involvement in the Yemen conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, despite the Saudis being their primary aid provider.

Credible deterrence would require Pakistani missiles stationed in Saudi Arabia, which remains possible but necessitates Chinese approval. While China has previously facilitated such arrangements, Trump has secured $2 trillion in Gulf deals, including $142 billion in Saudi arms sales and $600 billion in investments. It seems improbable that the US would permit China to establish a nuclear umbrella in the region.

Deterrence might be structured along conventional lines instead. Bilaterally, this could result in Saudi financial support for Pakistani defense forces—primarily using US weaponry—fulfilling Islamabad's aspirations. These resources might be restricted from deployment against India given strong Saudi-India relations, which align with India's disinterest in Indo-Pakistani conflict. Nevertheless, a robust military sufficiently satisfies Pakistan's fragile national ego and perpetual quest for parity with India. If this alliance expands as Iran suggests, it might develop around the existing Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, established in 2015 under former Pakistan army chief Raheel Sharif. Such an arrangement would be even less likely to target India.

The US role in this arrangement warrants examination. According to available information, Pakistan's primary function relates to Iran and Afghanistan. The Trump administration appears to seek 'cheap deterrence' in West Asia without deploying American troops, similar to relegating Ukraine to European deterrence and NATO—areas from which the US intends to withdraw. This suggests global challenges are being outsourced to regional powers, who may address them at their discretion. This approach corresponds with Arab nations' reluctance to directly intervene in Gaza beyond issuing occasional mild statements. While this strategy may serve West Asian interests, Pakistan's unexpected elevation in status clearly targets India and challenges its emerging economic power status. India may consequently face pressure to increase defense expenditure—similar to European nations—despite prioritizing economic growth.

In conclusion, this defense pact—if it genuinely exists or will be fully implemented—targets various Asian actors: West Asia, India, China, and even Russia, while financially benefiting the United States. Trump's disruptive foreign policy apparently extends beyond tariffs and trade to include nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, respected Pakistani media outlets believe that Pakistan's supposed 'victory' over India prompted Muslim nations to seek Islamabad's leadership. If this belief forms the foundation for developing a nuclear umbrella doctrine, it is fundamentally flawed. Refusing to acknowledge hard realities provides a poor basis for strategic planning—one constant amid a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.

(Tara Kartha was with the National Security Council Secretariat)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author