Why India Should Avoid the Russian Su-57: Strategic Risks and Indigenous Alternatives

Recent reports indicating the Indian Air Force's consideration of the Russian Su-57 as a potential "stopgap" fifth-generation fighter aircraft deserve serious scrutiny. While acquiring a readily available platform might seem like a practical approach to addressing operational deficiencies, adopting the Su-57 would likely constitute a significant strategic error for India.

The Su-57 is not unfamiliar to India's defense establishment. Previously, the IAF had committed approximately $290 million to participate in its development through the PAK-FA program before ultimately withdrawing. This decision was based on comprehensive evaluations that revealed substantial shortcomings in the aircraft's fifth-generation capabilities. Its stealth characteristics failed to match American standards set by the F-22 or F-35, it lacked supercruise capability, and Russia was unwilling to share critical aspects of design control, technology transfer, or production responsibilities to India's satisfaction. These fundamental issues remain unresolved, and the platform's limitations have become increasingly apparent over time.

Russia's own limited deployment of the Su-57 raises significant questions. Despite touting it as their most advanced fighter aircraft, Moscow has inducted only about 24 units into service. Perhaps more telling is Russia's reluctance to utilize these aircraft decisively in the ongoing Ukraine conflict. This hesitation to deploy their premier fighter in actual combat conditions should prompt serious concerns about the platform's operational effectiveness.

The extensive sanctions currently constraining Russia's defense industry have created a problematic dependency on foreign components for the Su-57, particularly Chinese electronics and subsystems. For India, this represents an unacceptable security vulnerability. No nation should compromise its aerial sovereignty by relying on platforms potentially dependent on an adversary's supply chain.

The proposed acquisition scale—potentially seven squadrons with two directly from Russia and the remainder assembled in India—extends well beyond a temporary solution. Seven squadrons represents a major strategic investment, coincidentally matching the exact number the IAF has designated for India's indigenous fifth-generation fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), currently under development. Such extensive commitment to the Su-57 would not merely fill an operational gap but could potentially undermine India's domestic fighter aircraft program.

The timeline for Su-57 acquisition invalidates the "stopgap" rationale. Even with immediate contract signing, initial deliveries would likely take three to four years, with two complete squadrons requiring approximately three additional years—all under optimal conditions. Russia's current production capacity of roughly six aircraft annually, compromised by wartime constraints, suggests that the Su-57 would not meaningfully enter Indian service until the mid-2030s. By that time, the AMCA—already in prototyping—could be approaching operational status, creating an unnecessary programmatic overlap rather than addressing immediate capability shortfalls.

Substantial investment in the Su-57 threatens to perpetuate a cycle of dependency that undermines India's aerospace ambitions. Such large-scale importation would directly compete with resources needed for the Light Combat Aircraft program and the AMCA development. Rather than strengthening domestic aerospace capabilities, this approach would relegate India to license-production while diverting essential funding from indigenous innovation efforts.

While critics may argue that India's AMCA might not initially match the capabilities of the F-22 or F-35 in stealth and supercruise performance, even a somewhat less advanced indigenous fighter offers significant advantages over importing the Su-57. An Indian-developed platform provides the foundation for continuous evolution through operational feedback, iterative upgrades, and technology integration. Critically, it ensures Indian control over design evolution, supply chain integrity, and future capability development—strategic benefits that foreign imports cannot provide.

The IAF's previous assessment of the Su-57's shortcomings remains valid. The aircraft has not developed into the capable stealth fighter that its marketing suggested. Russia's reluctance to deploy it in Ukraine highlights persistent deficiencies, while the current geopolitical environment—characterized by Russian dependence on China and Western sanctions—further reduces its reliability as a defense partner.

India faces legitimate concerns regarding fighter strength, but compromising its future air power capabilities for a platform already deemed inadequate is counterproductive. The strategic focus should instead prioritize accelerated Tejas production, committed support for AMCA development, and selective acquisition of proven fourth-plus generation fighters only where absolutely necessary to address critical operational gaps.

The Su-57 represents neither an effective interim solution nor a sustainable long-term strategy. It constitutes a costly diversion that India would be wise to avoid.

(Yusuf T. Unjhawala is an Adjunct Scholar at the Takshashila Institution.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author