Opinion | No, This Is Not About Ganging Up Against The US

What could arguably be the most 'consequential' visit of the Prime Minister has concluded. This descriptor, once reserved for India-US relations, may ironically now apply to the Beijing trip, given the daily outbursts from the White House. The disparagement and insults from White House officials have added significance to what might otherwise have been an overlooked event. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has typically been uneventful, but now appears to be gaining momentum with its largest gathering ever. India's participation added particular interest, especially considering Delhi's deliberate decision to visit Japan first—a type of diplomatic signaling not witnessed in decades.

The Prime Minister's visit to Japan before proceeding to China—for what was fundamentally a multilateral rather than bilateral meeting—is noteworthy. It somewhat mirrored Beijing's practice of grouping India and Pakistan together during diplomatic visits. There was an additional element: Beijing was hosting a grand celebration marking its victory over Japan in World War II. The Prime Minister's absence from this event with other dignitaries is significant. What likely irritated the Chinese even more was the unqualified success of his Japan visit regarding optics, warmth, and formal agreements. With over 70 dialogue mechanisms and groups already established, relations are thriving, but the Joint Statement contains two particularly interesting components. First, there's a commitment to facilitate more than 500,000 people-to-people exchanges to promote talent mobility—a significant positive development as the US threatens India regarding H-1B visas.

Even more intriguing is the Agreement on Security Cooperation, which outlines a surprisingly extensive range of increased military activities: exercises, enhanced logistics cooperation, research and development, special forces interactions, defense equipment supply, an annual NSA-to-NSA dialogue—all aimed at creating, among other objectives, a "coercion-free Indo-Pacific" and addressing common security interests. The Prime Minister arrived in Beijing carrying this substantial package of achievements.

Modi's meeting with Xi garnered worldwide attention; it displayed a certain cordiality, with both leaders describing themselves as "development partners and not rivals." China's customary statement that border issues should not define the overall China-India relationship was met with India's predictable emphasis on "border first." After all, Xi's metaphor of a "dancing of the dragon and the elephant" is hardly feasible when one partner remains vigilant against further territorial encroachment.

While Beijing advocated for a "multipolar world," India countered with the concept of a "multipolar Asia." The statement essentially built upon agreements already reached during Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to India, addressing direct air flights and opening trade routes. Notably, India carefully expressed that improving relations "should not be seen through a third country lens"—explicitly rejecting any notion of aligning against the United States or others. This leaves room for improving ties with Washington at a much later date, though no one has abandoned that possibility yet.

The presence of National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) officials at the discussions may indicate potential movement toward addressing the $99 billion trade deficit. This organization has been managing responses to US tariffs and economic policies, including with countries like Kazakhstan that have also been severely impacted by tariffs. Trade represents a major area where Beijing needs to make concessions, for its own benefit. This is particularly relevant since Beijing hasn't yet agreed to comprehensive data sharing regarding rivers, limiting it to emergency sharing on humanitarian grounds. Though Beijing may display handshakes and goodwill, if it wishes to deliver on the SCO's courtesies, opening up on trade is essential, especially since India has indicated it may lift restrictions on Chinese Foreign Direct Investment.

Then there was the evident camaraderie with Russian President Vladimir Putin in photo opportunities and in the Kremlin's meeting readout. That meeting included numerous ministers and warm language about "trust-based relations for decades." The MEA's readout was concise and emphasized the need to end the Ukraine conflict. Later, however, state media apparently reconsidered and discussed the two countries standing "shoulder to shoulder" during challenging times.

This is undeniably accurate; Russia's provision of weaponry during the Galwan conflict is now widely acknowledged. However, the "cheap oil"—now even cheaper as Urals crude prices have declined further with a discount of approximately $3 per barrel—may not continue indefinitely. Russia is reconnecting with international buyers, and reports suggest major companies like Exxon Mobil are discussing returning to the Sakhalin oil fields. This could end India's significant refinery boom. While Russia has offered to produce the S-500 and fifth-generation Su-57 in India for export—a substantial opportunity—both deals are designed to circumvent sanctions. This may no longer be feasible for India, despite the BrahMos missile gaining legendary status after "Operation Sindoor."

Putin's upcoming visit requires substantial deliverables, and Delhi must make decisions or risk losing a valuable ally. India needs to increase exports to Russia to address the concerning $58 billion deficit—partially offset by $12+ billion in fuel price savings—but this imbalance requires attention. Russia needs to import pharmaceuticals, machinery, and equipment from India rather than China. This requires Indian industry to enhance its capabilities. India Inc. invests less than 0.66% of GDP in research and development, while China invests 8.7%—explaining why one is competitive while the other merely profits.

This brings us back to the United States, where trade has consistently grown to drive India's economic growth. This relationship now faces risks, not just regarding trade but also concerning how Indians are perceived in the US and whether the influential diaspora can maintain its position. While circumstances remain fluid, what's clear is this isn't an either-or situation. It may be challenging for India to fully commit to a grouping like the SCO, despite its ambitious proposals and 26 documents including the Tianjin declaration. The grouping's only common thread is their connection to China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a China that has failed to provide the leadership and financing needed to energize each struggling economy in a Marshall Plan-type approach that once benefited Europe and established US global power. Instead, China is extracting whatever resources each country possesses.

At Tianjin, India demonstrated an ambidextrous policy of engaging with both friends and adversaries, using one to balance the other. This approach has merit. However, ultimately, this isn't merely about timely visits and elaborate joint statements—it's about trade and business. India Inc. must recognize that innovation is essential to maintaining our standing, not merely assembling components and reselling them. To empower foreign policy, India must invigorate its industry. In an era when sanctions threats may become commonplace, this is what will keep us afloat and maintain foreign investor interest.

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author