Former CIA Spymaster Reveals How AQ Khan Built Nuclear Network with Pakistani Generals on Payroll

James Lawler served in the CIA from 1980 to 2005

Washington:

Distinguished former CIA officer James Lawler, widely recognized for dismantling A Q Khan's nuclear smuggling network, shared insights about his intelligence career, explaining the origin of his nickname "Mad Dog" and why he labeled Khan the "Merchant of Death".

In an interview with ANI, the former head of the CIA's Counter-Proliferation Division elaborated on his pivotal role in exposing and undermining global nuclear trafficking networks connected to the Pakistani scientist.

Lawler described how his covert operations eventually targeted AQ Khan's proliferation network. The United States had been monitoring Khan's involvement in developing Pakistan's nuclear capability for years before analysts comprehended the extensive scope of his outward trafficking activities.

"We were very slow. We thought it was serious that he was supplying Pakistan, but we did not imagine he was going to turn around and become an outward proliferator," he explained. "I nicknamed AQ Khan the 'Merchant of Death.'"

He revealed that CIA intelligence confirmed Khan's operation was providing materials to multiple foreign nuclear programs. Regarding Pakistani involvement, Lawler disclosed, "AQ Khan had certain Pakistani generals and leaders on his payroll," while clarifying that individual complicity did not represent official state policy.

Lawler's account detailed his counter-proliferation career beginning during an assignment in a "beautiful Alpine country" known for advanced technology sought by nations pursuing nuclear weapons. After returning to CIA headquarters in 1994, he was chosen to lead the counter-proliferation office in the European division before being tasked with infiltrating and disrupting Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Elaborating on his methodology, Lawler explained how Felix Dzerzhinsky's "Trust" operation inspired him to establish covert overseas entities that appeared to supply nuclear-related technology. "If I want to defeat proliferation and proliferators, I need to become a proliferator," he stated. These entities conducted sting operations delivering compromised materials designed to impede illicit nuclear development. "We took the reverse of the Hippocratic oath. We always did harm."

This strategy paralleled how AQ Khan's network itself evolved. Over decades, the network expanded substantially, transitioning from procurement to comprehensive trafficking. "Instead of being a consumer of this technology, they became a purveyor of the technology," Lawler observed, highlighting Khan's influence and popularity in Pakistan.

He attributed the initially slow American response to limited resources and competing geopolitical crises during the 1970s and 1980s, including Afghanistan's Soviet invasion and Latin American conflicts. He dismissed claims that Saudi pressure influenced US inaction, emphasizing that counter-proliferation only became prioritized in the 1990s.

A critical shift occurred when analysts presented evidence confirming outward proliferation. The CIA subsequently expanded contacts and infiltrated the network across multiple jurisdictions with a small team. No more than 10 officers at headquarters focused exclusively on the operation, supported by field personnel overseas.

Following 9/11, concerns about Libya, then designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, intensified the mission's urgency. Lawler highlighted the CIA's interception of the BBC China freighter, carrying "hundreds of thousands of nuclear components." When US negotiators confronted Libyan officials with the seized materials, "You could have heard a pin drop." Libya subsequently dismantled its program, and he remembered "dancing a little happy jig" beside the recovered containers, noting this likely prevented Gaddafi from using such weapons years later.

The broader proliferation landscape also involved Iran. Lawler explained that Iran's program relied on designs originally stolen from URENCO, utilizing the same P1 and P2 centrifuge models supplied through AQ Khan. Khan's network also transferred ballistic missile technology and a Chinese atomic bomb blueprint. "I think they got all of it," he noted.

This led to his warning that an Iranian nuclear weapon could trigger a "nuclear pandemic," prompting regional powers to seek their own deterrents and dramatically increasing the risk of nuclear conflict across the Middle East.

Lawler addressed why the United States tolerated Pakistan's nuclear development while opposing Iran's, suggesting policymakers may have turned "a blind eye" due to Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, while acknowledging many decisions carried long-term consequences.

His account included close monitoring of Pakistan's nuclear assets after 9/11. CIA Director George Tenet and the Counterterrorist Center ensured AQ Khan was not providing nuclear material to al-Qaeda. Tenet personally confronted then-Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf with evidence of Khan's proliferation activities.

Defending CIA sabotage techniques, Lawler explained that the agency ensured equipment supplied to illicit programs was compromised. Centrifuge facilities were particularly vulnerable, and the CIA made certain that "things would constantly break and not work."

Reflecting on his decades of service, Lawler stated he had no major regrets and found profound purpose in counter-proliferation efforts. He now writes spy novels based on his experiences, all approved by the CIA's review board.

Recounting the origin of his "Mad Dog" nickname, Lawler traced it to a late 1980s incident while posted in France. He described being attacked by a German shepherd during a morning run, fighting off the dog, and later being warned it was likely rabid. "I made a list of all the people who I was going to bite in case I got rabies. That led to my nickname, which I come by quite honestly," he remarked, noting many colleagues still use it.

He emphasized the importance of stronger cooperation between India and the United States, describing earlier relations as "in between" and neither adversarial nor fully aligned. He stressed shared strategic interests and warned that a nuclear exchange in South Asia would leave "only losers" and cause global devastation.

James Lawler, who served in the CIA from 1980 to 2005, maintained that preventing proliferation remains essential to reducing nuclear dangers even as complete disarmament remains distant.