Former CIA Officer Reveals How US Deliberately Ignored Pakistan's Nuclear Program During Cold War

Former CIA intelligence officer Richard Barlow.

Washington:

Richard Barlow, a former CIA intelligence officer, revealed that the United States deliberately overlooked Pakistan's secret nuclear weapons development during the 1980s to maintain Pakistani support for channeling covert military aid to Afghan mujahideen fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Speaking in a comprehensive interview with ANI, Barlow, who served as a non-proliferation expert across the CIA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of Defence, disclosed that despite possessing substantial evidence of Pakistan's atomic weapons program led by AQ Khan's networks, high-ranking US officials intentionally misled Congress.

"We possessed considerable intelligence about Pakistan's nuclear program within the Directorate of Intelligence, which is primarily analytical. We had massive amounts of intelligence regarding the Pakistani networks. The fundamental issue was that no one in our government was taking action. Both myself and my entire chain of command in the directorate of intelligence were deeply concerned that Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons could pose a severe threat to US and Western international security. Our challenge was that the Directorate of Operations, engaged in the first Afghan war fighting Soviets alongside the Mujahideen, showed no interest in acting against the Pakistani networks," Barlow explained.

Barlow stated that the Ronald Reagan administration prioritized its Afghanistan strategy over nuclear non-proliferation efforts. He referenced former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1980 memorandum which declared, "we cannot let our proliferation policy dictate our foreign policy."

Brzezinski served as national security adviser during Jimmy Carter's presidency from 1977 to 1981.

"Zbigniew Brzezinski essentially initiated this problematic situation, in my view. He authored a very significant memo around 1980. This wasn't an intelligence failure - there was abundant intelligence. The problems stemmed from policy decisions," he said.

"That's precisely what occurred," Barlow continued. "The Cold Warriors held control. Combating the Soviets was the paramount priority. They completely failed to recognize the threat that Islamism could present if Pakistan obtained nuclear weapons. They viewed everything exclusively through the Cold War Soviet perspective."

Barlow detailed a 1987 undercover operation targeting Pakistani agent Arshad Pervez, who attempted to purchase 25 tons of maraging steel - critical for uranium enrichment - from an American company. This joint CIA-US Customs operation revealed connections to retired Brigadier General Inam-ul-Haq, a known procurement agent for both Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).

"A Pakistani named Arshad Pervez, residing in Canada, contacted a US steel company seeking approximately 25 metric tons of maraging 350 steel. He was operating under retired Pakistani general Inam ul Haq and was scheduled to appear at the Pennsylvania steel company. However, certain State Department officials had warned the Pakistani government about the pending arrest warrant."

Barlow claimed the operation was compromised when senior State Department officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Peck, allegedly alerted Pakistan about Haq's imminent arrest.

"I was furious. These were people within my own government - the enemy from within," Barlow recalled.

Arshad Pervez's arrest provoked outrage in Congress. Lawmakers including Representative Stephen Solarz and Senator Larry Pressler demanded suspending all Pakistani aid under the Solarz and Pressler Amendments, which prohibited assistance to countries illegally pursuing nuclear weapons.

Despite clear violations, Barlow stated that the White House and State Department found legal loopholes to maintain aid to Pakistan.

"I would concur that by 1986-87, most of us believed Pakistan had manufactured all components of a nuclear weapon. The lawyers were searching for any possible workaround," he explained.

Barlow maintained that his counterproliferation efforts had received approval from the highest levels of US government, including the White House, Defense Secretary, and CIA Director. Nevertheless, political decisions ensured Pakistan avoided penalties.

"I couldn't possibly have conducted these operations without top-level approval. Yet despite knowing everything, they still refused to hold Pakistan accountable," he said.

Barlow later testified before Congress alongside National Intelligence Officer David Einsel, who allegedly maintained close White House connections and was instructed not to endanger US aid to the Afghan Mujahideen.

"There were serious concerns that Einsel wasn't being truthful with Congress regarding Pakistan's nuclear activities," Barlow stated.

His testimony generated tensions within the intelligence community and exposed the profound division between the CIA's analytical divisions and political leadership concerning the handling of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.