Xi's Show Of Unity With Putin, Kim Could Complicate China's Diplomatic Balance
If the purpose of a rarejoint appearanceof the leaders of Russia, North Korea and China on Sept. 3, 2025, was to foster unity among allies, then early indicators suggest its already working just elsewhere.
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The rare gathering of leaders from Russia, North Korea, and China on September 3, 2025, appears to have achieved its goal of demonstrating unity—though perhaps not in the way Beijing intended. The aftermath has prompted swift responses across the Indo-Pacific region.
Just two days following the Beijing meeting, Japan and Australia announced plans to enhance their security cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific. By September 11, a security agreement between Japan and the Philippines took effect, allowing their military forces to operate within each other's territories. These developments reflect growing solidarity among Pacific nations concerned about China's assertiveness.
President Xi Jinping's decision to prominently feature Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un during China's commemoration of the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II sent a deliberate message. Beijing clearly intended to showcase solidarity among the three nations in opposition to Western influence. Western media outlets quickly recognized this display as Beijing's attempt to herald a new international order with China at its center.
As a specialist in Northeast Asian security and China's grand strategy, I see these developments creating significant challenges for Beijing. This approach potentially constrains Xi strategically by aligning him more closely with two unpredictable neighbors while undermining China's claims to be a neutral global mediator. Most critically, it risks further damaging China's already tenuous relationships with Europe and Asian partners.
This diplomatic strategy may ultimately prove counterproductive for China's interests.
China's Delicate Ukraine PositionChina's strengthening ties with internationally isolated states didn't emerge suddenly. It follows years of escalating tensions between China and Western nations.
The Ukraine conflict has been central to the deteriorating China-Europe relationship, despite Beijing's persistent claims of neutrality and calls for diplomatic solutions.
Earlier this year, China expressed displeasure with Pyongyang for its increasingly public military support to Russia and growing alignment with Moscow.
Xi's high-profile appearance alongside Putin and Kim potentially undermines China's previous positions, placing the Chinese president in an awkward diplomatic situation. It creates the impression that Beijing tacitly approves the Russia-North Korea partnership and their combined efforts in Ukraine.
Driving EU And US CooperationIn Brussels, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas characterized the gathering of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean leaders at Beijing's parade as an "authoritarian alliance" challenging the rules-based international order.
Against this backdrop, China's alignment with Russia and North Korea will likely intensify European security concerns and further strain already troubled China-EU economic ties.
This could prompt the EU to expand anti-dumping measures against China or accelerate efforts to reduce economic dependence on Beijing. Such actions would impact China's struggling economy: In 2024, China served as the European Union's primary import source, with bilateral trade reaching US$609 billion, while the EU represented China's second-largest export market.
Paradoxically, while U.S. President Donald Trump's second-term policies—including overtures to Putin and his "America First" agenda—have weakened traditional transatlantic alliances, the emerging China-Russia-North Korea axis may produce the opposite effect: compelling Trump to embrace European partnerships to counter this new bloc.
Notably, on September 4, just after the Beijing parade, Trump urged European leaders to increase economic pressure on China and accused Beijing of financing Russia's Ukraine campaign. The European Commission appears already inclined toward this approach, recently announcing consideration of including several independent Chinese refineries in its latest round of Russia sanctions.
South Korea's Shifting ApproachThe alignment of China, Russia, and North Korea also risks accelerating a trend Beijing has long resisted: a China containment strategy through anti-Beijing alliances across the Pacific.
We're already witnessing increased U.S.-Philippines naval exercises, U.S.-Indonesia led multilateral drills, and strengthened defense ties between Japan and the Philippines.
The Putin-Kim-Xi alliance will likely push Japan and South Korea—both currently maintaining relatively moderate positions toward China—to distance themselves from Beijing and further strengthen their U.S. alliances to counter this emerging bloc.
On September 11, the U.S. and Japan began two weeks of military exercises featuring the Typhon intermediate-range missile system, capable of striking mainland China. Starting September 15, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. will conduct annual drills to strengthen defenses against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.
Beyond alliances, Chinese policy risks hardening domestic opinion and foreign policies of other nations against Beijing.
In South Korea, the ruling Democratic Party has traditionally favored a friendlier approach toward China and North Korea while maintaining caution regarding its U.S. alliance and Japan relations.
This contrasts sharply with former President Yoon Suk Yeol's government, which adopted a hard-line stance toward China and North Korea while actively pursuing trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo.
Beijing's embrace of North Korea may now force Seoul to reconsider its China policy and revert to a more confrontational approach.
China's invitation bringing Kim Jong-un—long isolated and sanctioned internationally—to center stage in Beijing has been widely interpreted as tacit recognition of North Korea's nuclear status.
Notably, during the Xi-Kim summit on September 5, Beijing made no mention of Korean Peninsula denuclearization—a point heavily emphasized in South Korean media. This omission contrasted with their previous four meetings, where both sides had expressed support for denuclearization goals.
Japan's Diplomatic DilemmaJapan finds itself in a position similar to South Korea's.
Recently resigned Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was considered a pro-China moderate within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Since taking office in October 2024, Ishiba's approach marked a clear departure from predecessor Fumio Kishida, whose tough stance toward Beijing had significantly damaged Sino-Japanese relations.
Ishiba instead pursued stability, meeting Xi at the APEC summit in Lima, Peru, in November 2024, where both leaders committed to building a more stable and constructive partnership.
However, growing security concerns triggered by the China-Russia-North Korea alignment could push Japan toward adopting a tougher China policy moving forward.
Washington's reaction to the Beijing unity display remains uncertain. Though Trump praised China's parade as "beautiful" and "impressive," he appeared displeased with the joint appearance of Xi, Putin, and Kim, claiming on social media that their nations were "conspiring against" the United States.
A New Global Order?Collectively, the September 3 parade undeniably signaled Xi's ambition to establish a new international order with China at its core. It projected strong deterrence toward the U.S. and Western nations while emphasizing China's dominant position within the trilateral relationship with Russia and North Korea.
Nevertheless, I believe this high-profile alignment carries significant risks: It deepens Western and regional suspicions of an "axis of upheaval," threatens to further strain China's foreign relations, and likely accelerates balancing efforts against Beijing—most notably through closer transatlantic cooperation and strengthening of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance.
(Author: Linggong Kong, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Auburn University)
(This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.)
(Disclosure Statement: Linggong Kong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.)