Pakistan's 27th Constitutional Amendment: How General Asim Munir Is Securing Unprecedented Military Authority

The 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill, recently passed by Pakistan's Senate on November 10, represents a profound transformation of Pakistan's state structure rather than a simple procedural change. This legislation, currently awaiting National Assembly approval, effectively institutionalizes the military's dominance within Pakistan's constitutional framework, formalizing the transition from a hybrid military system to one where the military establishment holds explicit legal authority.

The bill's core revisions to Article 243 propose creating a new "Chief of Defence Forces" position while eliminating the existing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee role. These changes significantly alter the power dynamics between civilian leadership and military command regarding defense forces control. The amendments fundamentally reshape Pakistan's constitutional order and diminish civilian governmental authority.

Key provisions of the Article 243 amendments include abolishing the CJCSC office effective November 27, establishing the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) position to be held by the current Chief of Army Staff, creating a Commander of National Strategic Command appointed by the Prime Minister but on CDF recommendation, and granting lifelong constitutional protection to 5-star officers including Field Marshals with permanent privileges, tenure, and legal immunity.

These changes essentially restructure civil-military relations to accommodate General Asim Munir's ambitions. As sitting COAS, Munir will automatically assume the powerful CDF role, giving him exclusive authority to recommend who controls Pakistan's nuclear arsenal while commanding all military branches. The amendment legitimizes his Field Marshal promotion and provides unprecedented lifetime immunity from legal proceedings and removal from office.

While Pakistan's military has always wielded enormous influence over politics, economics, and national identity, these constitutional changes lend new credibility to the observation that "Pakistan is not a country with an army; it is an army with a country."

This amendment evokes historical military dictatorships in Pakistan. It mirrors General Ayub Khan's personalist ambitions, who similarly named himself Field Marshal and altered the constitution in 1962 to legitimize his autocratic rule. Munir appears to be building a constitutional structure concentrating power in a single officer rather than the institution.

The bill also follows General Zia-ul-Haq's legalist approach. After his 1977 coup, Zia secured a five-year presidential term through a controversial referendum and forced parliament to pass the 8th amendment, legalizing his coup and establishing controls over future governments.

Additionally, the amendment resembles General Pervez Musharraf's "dual-hat" structure, when he simultaneously held COAS and President positions. While Musharraf's arrangement was temporary and constitutionally ambiguous, the 27th Amendment permanently combines the COAS with the new CDF position, creating a constitutionally protected command structure.

Western capitals, particularly Washington, have shown no alarm regarding this constitutional shift, consistent with America's pragmatic approach to Pakistan. The US has historically engaged comfortably with Pakistan's military rulers, from Khan to Zia to Musharraf, including President Trump's recent White House lunch with Munir in June. American policy recognizes the military as Pakistan's power center, capable of ensuring security cooperation.

More critical is how the military establishment itself perceives this move. Historically, Pakistan's Army's influence has been institutional rather than individual. Both Khan and Musharraf lost power when their corps commanders determined they had become institutional liabilities.

For India, this formalization of Pakistan's military power likely won't alter its existing policy approach, which already views Pakistan through a highly securitized lens. India's "Military-Jihadi Complex" framework treats Pakistan's military and proxy groups as a unified entity, suggesting its official response will remain a cautious "wait and watch" stance.

(Aishwaria Sonavane is a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author